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THE DEMOCRATIC UNION FOR THE REPUBLIC: 
TO SURVIVE DE GAULLE 
by John S. Ambler 
As Secretary-General of the young Union for the New Republic (UNR)l 
in May, 1959, Albin Chalandon described a predicament which undoubt- 
edly has frustrated numerous Gaullist leaders in recent years. "General 
de Gaulle is our clandestine chief," said Chalandon. "Our position is a little 
like that of secret agents who owe total obedience to their military chief, 
who himself does not hesitate to disavow them when things go badly."" 
Chalandon found himself executive head of a party created to support a 
man who had no faith in parties, who was reluctant to acknowledge or 
identify himself with his party supporters, and almost as reluctant to reward 
them with power and public office. Insofar as they accept the Gaullist view 
of the state, Chalandon and his successors have produced a party which is 
suspicious of partisanship, if not of politics. Here lies one of the paradoxes 
of the party which holds many of the keys to future political stability in 
France. Another related paradox is Gaullism's blend of a modern style with 
lingering strains of traditional antirepublicanism. 
The views of its mentor, its doctrine and style, its composition, its pat- 
tern of development, and its organization all provide clues to the character 
and prospects of that movement which hopes to survivre 2 de Garrlle. We 
shall examine each of these, then, in a concluding section, attempt to  
sharpen our analysis of the problems of the present Gaullist party, the 
Union Ddmocratique pour la RCpublique (UDR), by comparing it with 
modern "catchall" parties in other major democracies. 
I. De Gcilrlle orz Political Parties 
Given the markedly negative connotations of "party politician" in France 
voters in the first years of the Fifth Republic, and the danger of alienatin, 
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who identified with traditional parties, Charles de Gaulle might well have 
chosen an above-party posture simply out of tactical considerations. In fact, 
his aloofness from parties - including his own -was more deeply rooted. 
From the fall of France in 1940 down to the present day, de Gaulle time 
and again has expressed his contempt for the traditional parties -the 
"partis de jadis" - whose "decadence," whose attachment to selfish minor- 
ity interests, whose divisiveness and quarrelsomeness, whose inability to 
govern, whose reluctance to renounce the "sterile games" of the "rkgime 
des partis," undermined the solidarity, the stability, and the greatness of 
the French nation, and, he argues, led directly to the fall of France in 1940 
and again to the Algerian crisis of May, 1958.' 
In his famous Bayeux speech of June 16, 1946 (later adopted by the 
UNR as one of its major doctrinal statements), de Gaulle seemed to accept 
such parties as endemic to France: "In brief, the rivalry of parties in our 
country takes on a fundamental character that sets everything adrift and 
very often wrecks the superior interests of the country. This is an obvious 
fact which is due to our national tcmperarnent, to the accidents of our 
history, and to the disturbances of today, but which our institutions must 
take into consideration in order to preserve the respect for law, the cohesion 
of governments, the efficiency of administrations, and the prestige and au- 
thority of the state."> The remedy, he argued, must be institutional and 
must come from outside the party system. The executive must cease to be 
-'merely a delegate of his party"; he must be independent, powerful, and 
capable of protecting the national interest against the onslaught of seIf- 
interested elites both inside and outside the parties. As early as September, 
1944, de Gaulle sensed the reservations, the private ambitions, of " 'poli- 
ticians,' new and old," and concluded-in traditional Bonapartist fashion- 
that "more than ever, thcn, I had to seek support from the French pcoplc 
rather than from the 'elite' groups which tended to come between us."" 
For de Gaulle, apparently only the national leader, in mystic or plebisci- 
tary contact with "the people," is capable of perceiving and defending the 
nationaI interest. 
De Gaulle rarely has seen fi t  to cxempt even Gaullist parties from the 
mistrusted category of "intermediary bodies." Twice during the Fourth 
Republic he placed hope in a political party and in both instances felt him- 
self betrayed. As Premier of the provisional French government for eighteen 
months following the liberation of France, de Gaulle enjoyed strong and 
consistent support from the newly organized Motivement RkpzlDlicail~ Pop- 
ulaire ( M R P ) ,  the French Christian Democratic Party, which in 1945 
proudly declared itself to be the "pmt i  cle la fidtlir6 to dc Gaulle.When 
de Gaulle resigned in January, 1946, in protest over the reluctance of the 
Socialist and Communist parties to follow his lead, however, the MRP, in- 
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stead of demanding submission to de Gaulle, facilitated the creation of a 
successor government by joining a tripartite coalition with the Communist 
Party and the Socialist Party. MRP leaders explained that were they to 
refuse participation, the Comnlunists might well seize control of the exeeu- 
tive. Unconvinced and embittered, de Gaulle dismissed the MRP leaders 
as unfaithful allies, either inspired by narrow partisan ambitions or, at best, 
weak men trapped already by "the system." The brecch widened when 
MRP leaders supported the second draft constitution in the referendum of 
October, 1946 - despite de Gaulle's strong opposition - and again in 
the spring of 1947, when the party forbade its members and officeholders 
from taking joint membership in de Gaulle's newly formed Rnssemblemei~t 
du Perlple Frati~ais (RPF). 
Persuaded that the princes of the new rigiine des prrrtis would never 
effect from within those reforms necessary to restore French political unity 
and authority, de Gaulle determined in the spring of 1947 to create a broad 
new political organization, the RPF, whose specific mission would be to 
reform the French state. As its name implied, the RPF was intended not to 
to be simply another party, adding further to the political divisions of an 
already divided nation. It was intended to bring together men of various 
parties in a common effort for political reform. The device of "double 
n~embership" proved ineffective, however, as SociaIists and Popular Re- 
publicans were forbidden by their parties to affiliate, and many of those 
Radicals and Moderates who were eager to restore with the Gaullist Iabel 
their prestige lost in the war quickly balkcd when asked also to accept 
Gaullist discipline.: A strong GauHist vote of almost 40 percent in the 
municipal elections of 1947 fadcd to 23 pcrcent and I20 Assembly seats 
in the legislative elections of June, 1951. Within two years thereafter, de 
Gaulle had disassociated himself from his deputies. With few exceptions, 
designed to split the opposition, the General had determined that there 
should be no collaboration with other parties until the constitution had been 
revised. As power within the National Assembly shifted to the Right, how- 
ever - and especially when Antoine Pinay bccame Prime Minister in 1952 
-the temptation to play the parliamentary game proved irresistible to 
many on the RFP benches. Again dc Gaulle felt himself betrayed - this 
time by deputies who rode to office on his own good name. 
When crumbling political authority at home and a full scale revolt in 
Algeria forced the National Assenlbly to recall de Gaulle in June, 1958, 
he was understandably reluctant to tie his fate to another Gaullist party. 
The Union pour la Nouvelle Re'publique was the creation of Gaullists, but 
not of de Gaulle, who before the elections of November, 1958, forbade any 
party from using his name, even as an adjective. Only when he became fear- 
ful of being crippled by a hostile parliamentary majority in the elections of 
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November, 1962 - and then only momentarily and obliquely, without 
mentioning the name of the UNR - did de Gaulle descend from the heights 
of aj~olitisme to call upon French voters to "confirm" their recent referen- 
dum vote for popular election of the President by electing his s~ppor te rs .~  
In local elections de Gaulle has remained silent. In his own presidential 
election of December, 1965, he made no mention of the UNR. He shuns 
all party meetings and takes only a very indirect hand in such critical mat- 
ters as party doctrine and organization. He attempted to give the cabinet a 
distinctly nonpartjsan character. Only in the legislative elections of March, 
1967, did he begin to play the part of a party leader. 
Herein lies one of the major paradoxes of the Gaullist party: it was de- 
signed to support and to survive a leader who doubts the legitimate role of 
political parties in the democratic process. As we shall see, many of its diffi- 
culties stem from this predicament. 
11. Style crnd Doctrii7e 
Clearly one of the preeminent characteristics of de Gaulle as a political 
leader is his blend of fixity in objectives (the greatness of France) with 
great flexibility in choice of means. A party created to support such a 
leader is faced with unusual problems of doctrinal and programmatic con- 
sistency. Gaullists who, under the Fourth Republic, had believed Algeria 
to be forever French, for example, watched in dismay as the General moved 
toward a settlement which granted "association" in name and independence 
in fact to that North African territory. Understandably, de Gaulle is reluc- 
tant to allow a Gaullist party to commit itself to any beliefs or programs 
which might limit his flexibility. Hence, like de Gaulle himself, the UDR 
can be characterized not so much by its program as by its style, the major 
elements of which are professed nonpartisanship, pragmatism, efficiency, 
and modernism. 
Following the example of the master, Jacques Baumel, as Secretary- 
General of the UNR, asserted that "the vocation of Gaullism is not to be 
a political party, but to bring together Frenchnlen."" UNR recruitment 1ite~- 
ature reiterated the theme that "the UNR is not a party, particularly not a 
party like the others."'" It is rather "the union of Frenchmen and French- 
women, of all origins, determined to support, without the spirit of party, 
the action of General de GauIle and pursue his work within the framework 
of the Fifth Rep~bl ic . " '~  
Faced with the organizational and electoral tasks of a politica1 party, 
however, the U N R  and its successor, the UDR, find tl~emselves caught in 
embarrassing contradictions in their effort to create an above-party image. 
In the cantonal elections of March, 1964, for example, the UNR head- 
quarters in Paris compiled a "Candidate's Dossier" in which a curious mix 
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of "major themes of our campaign" are laid out. On the one hand, candi- 
dates are advised to stress sucl? slogans as: "No politics in the General 
Councils," and "The cantonal elections are elections of persons," while, 
on the other hand, repeating such partisan mottos as: "Chase out the Com- 
munists, foreign agents," "Eliminate the men of the Fourth Republic," and 
"Only the Gaullists can hold back the Popular Front."12 The municipal elec- 
tions of March, 1965, again involved the UNR in similar contradictions." 
Joined to the nonpartisan image in the speeches and writings of the 
Gaullist leaders is the recurrent insistence that the Gaullist party - in 
contrast to the doctrinaire incompetence of the traditional parties- is 
interested primarily in the pragmatic and efficient solution of concrete prob- 
lems. When critics argue that the UDR has no doctrine, Gaullist leaders 
often reply that the country has had enough ideological warfare; what is 
needed now, as former Secretary-General Jacques Baumel put it, is a 
"practical approach to the great problems, a sense of the real and the con- 
crete, to the exclusion of all ideology and of all a-priorism."l' "The prob- 
lems are much more technical than political," added Baumel in early 1965.l" 
Gaullist deputies are no longer harangued by their leaders in the tradi- 
tional oratorical style, we are told. Rather, they are "invited to model their 
behavior on the exampIe of a business manager charged with DIRECTING 
with the goal of PRODUCING."'The mutual appeal of the UDR and 
the managerial personnel in the larger private industries probably owes 
much to the movement's respect for technocracy and efficiency.li 
In its own organizational efforts, the UDR exploits modern techniques 
in an attempt both at efficiency and at distinguishing itself from the partis 
de jrrdis. Party workers are trained in public relations techniques, and aid 
is purchased from such professional public relations firms as Services et 
MCthodes." Outside experts are brought into national congresses to lend a 
professional, technical air to the deliberations. Colloquia on specific prob- 
lems, again with experts invited, are held in various cities throughout the 
country. 
Without doubt the emphasis upon the efficient solution of concrete prob- 
lems has real advantages for a party which hopes to create a modern, non- 
ideological, classless image. Yet an emphasis upon technocracy leaves un- 
answered the essential political questions of who wiIl decide, and by what 
standards, upon priorities in policy goals and in the distribution of the 
national income. 
Although clearly the UDR has introduced a new style in French poli- 
tics, its uniqueness is not restricted to style. One must be cautious in talking 
of the beliefs of Gaullists in the absence of precise data, yet it would appear 
on the basis of documentary evidence that most Gaullist leaders share at 
least three attitudes, in addition to their loyalty to de Gaulle: they are 
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French nationalists; they believe in a strong, stable state, built around a 
strong executive who represents the national interest; and they consider 
themselves to be modern and progressive in comparison with the "prophets 
of the past" of the traditional parties.'" 
If Gaullism means anything more than simple obedience to de Gaulle, 
certainly it means attachment to the General's "certaitze id t e  de la France," 
to the notion of an active and independent French role in world affairs. 
". . . France is not really herself unless in the front rank," writes de Gaulle 
in the first paragraph of his War Memoirs. ". . . [Olnly vast enterprises are 
capable of counterbalancing the ferments of dispersal which are inherent 
in her people; . . . our country, as it is, surrounded by the others, as they 
are, must aim high and hold itself straight, on pain of mortal danger. In  
short, to my mind, France cannot be France without greatness."" In a sim- 
ilar vein, in the conclusion to his book, Au Service de la Nation, former 
Gaullist Prime Minister Michel DebrC writes, "The doctrine of this work, 
as the reader can verify, is a national doctrine. Its first principle is the exis- 
tence of the French Nation. Its first objective is the independence, the 
progress, the prestige of that nation."" Similarly for former cabinet minister 
Edmond Michelet (one of the purest of the Gaullist "itrconditioi~t~els"), 
for former Prime Minister Georges Pompidou, and even for most of the 
"Gaullists of the Left," Gaullism is at least in part a form of nationalism." 
T o  be sure, the Algerian problen~ demonstrated that the Gaullist notion 
of grandeur is sufficiently vague to permit conflicting interpretations. 
Secondly, and in part in order to allow the French nation to play its 
proper role, GaulIists from 1946 onward have insisted on replacement of 
stalemate assembly government with new institutions centering on a strong 
executive. This was the doctrinc - in fact the r ~ ~ i s o n  rt'L:tre - of the RPF. 
In turn the UNR, in its first National Congrcss in November, 1959, 
adopted the following resolution: "The fundamental doctrinc of the Union 
for the New Republic has its sources in the Baycux speech of 1946, where 
are defined the major designs for a restoration of thc state, founded upon 
separation and balance of powers."" Though Gaullists believe that French 
society must remain liberal and pluralistic, thcy bclieve in the ~lecessity of 
an independent president, created to scrve as arbitcr between rival interests, 
as guardian of the national interest, and as a constant check upon partisan 
ambitions. Thc constitutional amendment of 1962 - gcncrally accepted 
by Gaullists - added popular clcction of thc president to the GT u 11' 1st con- 
stitutional creed. Again, even the Gaullists of the Left (the former U i ~ i o n  
Dk~~roc.i'c/tiqrre clrr Ti.rrvnil) agrec with this party stand, though at times they 
wish the government had more faith in rcprescntative associations, both 
political and cconornic,* 
A third doctrinal link in the Gaullist chain is conlmitment to moderniza- 
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tion - political, economic, and military. "For me, the [Gaullist] adventure 
is essentiaIly the march toward the future," writes Edmond M i ~ h e l e t . ~ ~  
The UNR is the "formation de l'uvetzir," announces a party pamphlet.26 
"The profound thought of General de Gaulle can be expressed in a few 
words: 'renewal of French institutions,' " declared Albin Chalandon, the 
UNR's second Secretary-General.Y' Throughout party declarations runs this 
consistent theme: the UNR is a dynamic movement whose mission is to 
"construct the new France,"" to "lead this country toward the destinies of 
the Twenty-First Century.""' One of the party's publications was baptised 
La No~ivelle Fionti;ie, as evidence of the GaulIists' commitment to getting 
their own country moving. Rapid economic expansion, greater social justice, 
the application of modern techniques in the reform of French institutions, 
rapid population growth - all of these goals make of the Gaullist party a 
party of movement as well as a party of order, setting it far apart from the 
stalemate or reactionary parties of the traditional Right. 
When one proceeds to more specific questions of social and economic 
policy, however, the GauIlist consensus very nearly collapses. Here Gaul- 
list attitudes range from 1lri.vsez-fnire noninterventionism to democratic so- 
cialism. On the left are those like the leaders of the Uf7ioi7 D&~?zocr~tiq~{e cle 
Tiavcril (joined with the UNR in December, 1962), and of the Acfiorz 
O~illiii+o ct Pi.ofe.s.sionnelle within the UNR, many of whom continue to 
view Gaullism as "a socialism adapted to our old civilization," " as "the 
only socialism which has wed its century." ' Gaullists of this persuasion like 
to recall that it was the de Gaulle government of 1944-1946 which initi- 
ated state economic planning, which established France's first comprchen- 
sive social security system, and which nationalized tlic coal mines, gas 
and electricity. civil aviation, the merchant navy, four of the largest banks, 
and the Renault auton~obile factories. They recall that one of the central 
themes of RPF propaganda was the "association of capital and labor" 
through profit sharing and through institutionalized collcctive bargaining. 
Understandably, they reacted with dismay and alarm when de Gaullc re- 
turned from political exile and entri~stcd the powerful Ministry of Finance 
from 1958 to January. 1966, first to Antoine Pinay and next to Valiry 
Giscard d'Estaing - ncither of whom was a UNR member and both of 
whom were rclativcly orthodox economists whose primary eonccrn was 
with preventing inflation, even at the cost of freezing wages and delaying 
social welfare reforms. 
Since de Gauile has limited interest in  economic questions, his followcrs 
have few guidclincs around which to rally. All tend to agree with Miehel 
Debre that econonlic expansion and sonic redistribution of income through 
weIfarc state programs arc essential to that scrcial solidarity which in turn 
is a prerequisite of national grcati~ess.~' As early as November, 1959, the 
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first UNR national congress resolved that "the UNR manifests its determi- 
nation to carry through the abolition of the proletarian condition, thus 
escaping the capitalist-Marxist di lemma."~ '~aul l is ts  often disagree, how- 
ever, as to whether social progress ought also to be an important Gaullist 
goal in its own right, as to the appropriate pace of reform, and as to the 
proper role of interested groups (particularly labor unions) in the plan- 
ning process. Fearful that the UNR, once having decimated the parties of 
the traditional Right (as it did in the legislative elections of 1962), might 
simply absorb their economic views along with their voters, Gaullists of a 
reformist bent have carried on a sustained campaign to get on with pro- 
grams for redistribution of national income." This lack of consensus among 
Gaullists regarding social and economic policy presents one of the UDR's 
most serious problems in its effort to survive de Gaulle. 
If, as has been argued above, there exists a minimal consensus among 
Gaullists apart from simple fidelity, where should they then be placed on 
the French political spectrum? Despite protests from Gaullist leaders, it 
seems clear that the electorate thought of the UNR as a party of the Right. 
In a national survey conducted by the French Institute of Public Opinion 
(IFOP) in December, 1962, 55 percent of the respondents labeled the 
UNR as "Right," as opposed to 4 percent who viewed it as "Left," 22 per- 
cent as "Center," and 19 percent who expressed no opinion." In conrrast, 
only 44 percent of all respondents felt the Popular Republican Movement 
(MRP) to be "Right," and - surprisingly - only 39 percent so labeled 
the Independents. 
Looking beyond survey data, the answer to the "Right-Left" question 
depends in good part upon the criteria which one applies, for French atti- 
tudes and ideologies rarely fit neatly into a spectral frame. Tested by the 
traditional "red-black" criterion, Gaullist support for government subsidies 
to Catholic schools in 1951 and 1959 place the RPF  and the UNR on the 
moderate Right, though a vigorous minority of Gaullists opposed subsidies 
of any kind. However, given the numerous Protestants and Jews in its ranks, 
and given de Gaulle's suspicion of all private interests - including the 
Church - the UDR clearIy cannot be classified as a confessional party.'" 
It is significant that the law of December, 1967, which liberalized legaI 
prohibitions on birth control, was initiated by a prominent Gaullist deputy, 
Lucien Neuwirth, and voted into law with the acceptance of the government. 
A second popular criterion distinguishes parties according to their atti- 
tude toward governmental institutions, with the Left representing strong 
suspicion of the powerful state generally and of the strong executive in 
particular. Again, with its marked repugnance to assembly government and 
its constant defense of a strong, independent executive, Gaullism clearly 
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belongs to the Right. The institutional reforms written into the constitution 
of the Fifth Republic were similar to those which had been proposed from 
the Right for three-quarters of a century." Again, however, the criterion is 
of dubious value. The Radical-Socialist ideal of weak, assembly government 
was born in the era of the "stalemate society," when most Frenchmen feared 
change, and when the strong executives in recent memory were 
all antidemocratic.?' The Jacobins, it must be recalled, were believers in 
strong government; and present-day socialists clearly would need a strong 
executive if ever they were in a position (and still inclined) to implement 
their creed. 
If GauIlism is to the Right in its attitudes toward the state, its affinity is 
with the Bonapartist tradition more than with recent French parties of the 
Righr.""n its heterogeneous clientele, in its suspicion of parliaments and of 
intermediary bodies generally, in its reliance on the plebiscite, in its com- 
bination of stability and progress - in all of these respects Gaullism be- 
longs in the Bonapartist tradition. Yet the analogy must not be exaggerated. 
Gaullists are committed to democratic rights and freedoms in a way which 
clearly sets them apart from nineteenth-century Bonapartists, as does their 
passion for modernization. Moreover, though still passionately nationalistic, 
Gaullists evidence few imperialist pretentions; indeed, it was de Gaulle who 
presided over the dismantling of the French Empire. 
In the test of economic policy - capitalism versus socialism - Gaul- 
lism wins a more mixed rating, partly because of its ambivalent stand. 
Bankers, businessmen, and orthodox economists have had strong influence 
in the Fifth Republic."' Indeed, as a dynamic movement intent upon en- 
couraging economic efficiency and expansion, Gaullism finds itself drawn 
to large, modern enterprises, and badly estranged from small marginal 
producers and all on the political Center and Right who for genera- 
tions have rigidly defended vested interests. Nonetheless, the nationaliza- 
tion of industries under the first de Gaulle government, the insistence of 
Gaullists on controlling vested interests of all sorts, the Gaullist experiments 
with schemes for improving labor-management relations (usually against 
business protests), the frequent pledges of greater social justice, and the 
existence of a strong Left wing within the movement - a11 of these facts 
suggest that the UNR is not simply a modern capitalist party. 
When one takes foreign policy as the test of "Leftism," Gaullism falls 
more to the Left than to the Right. Though vehemently opposed to domestic 
communism, and clearly aligned with the West in time of crisis, France 
under de Gaulle has outdone the democratic Left in France in freeing the 
colonies, estabIishing French independence from the United States and en- 
couraging others to do likewise, withdrawing from NATO, and seeking a 
rapprochement with Eastern Europe and with the U.S.S.R." 
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As the present organizational bearer of the Gaullist movement, the UDR, 
all criteria considered, is not easily identifiable on a Left-Right spectrum. 
In good measure it is indeed, as Prime Minister Pompidou told the UNR 
National Council in June, 1966, "the synthesis of the Left and the Right, of 
order and movement,"" It is as well a blend of statism and democracy, of 
nationalism and realism. If eventually the UDR finds its home on the Right- 
Center (as appears likely), French conservatism will emerge transformed." 
111. LerirlerscrtzdVoters 
De Gaulle frequently is quoted as once having said that "everybody in 
France has been, is, or will be, a Gaullist." Both their quest for national 
unity and their desire to preserve the Fifth Republic impose upon Gaullists 
the task of seeking ever larger electoral majorities. Indeed, in the course of 
de Gaulle's long career, most Frenchmen from the extreme Left to the ex- 
treme Right have found some point at which they accepted him as a cham- 
pion - be it with the wartime resistance, or with the R P F  against the 
re'gime des pnrtis, or in apparent defense of French Algeria in 1958, or 
subsequently as the grantor of Algerian independence and the defender 
against the Secret Army Organization. 
The most consistent Gaullists, however, have been predominantly certain 
of those compagnoizs whose loyalty dates from 1940. In an assertion of 
parry unity in 1963, Prime Minister Georges Pompidou characteristically 
argued that ". . . our solidarity was born first from our past, from the com- 
bat begun twenty-three years ago by General de Gaullc, a combat in which 
we joined in order to save the honor of France, to associate her with victory, 
to define the roads to salvation and finally to assume her leader~hip. ' '~~ 
In his book, Le Caullisn~e, Pcrssionrrt~te Avei7izrre, Edmond Michelet stresses 
the more personal, sentimental ties of GauIlism for ir7corrditionnels like him- 
self: "I will suggest that one of the most profound rcasons for our attach- 
ment to the man of June 18 stems, more than from that complicity in con- 
temptuous refusal of defeat which aniniated him and us, from that human 
solidarity which was born among the first cor~zpngrroi7s who shared his soli- 
tude."" These are the men - like Roger Frey, Michel DebrC, Jacques Cha- 
ban-Delmas, Christian Fouchet, Michel Maurice-Bokanowski, Andr6 Mal- 
raux, Pierre Billotte, Jacques Baumel, Edrnond Michelet, Gaston Palewski, 
and others - who followed de Gaullc through the war, the RPF, and into 
prominent position in the Fifth Republic. 
Of the 198 UNR deputies elected in 1958, 112 - slightly more than the 
Assembly average -had resistance records."; In the second Assembly of 
the Fifth Republic, as of April, 1965, sixteen of the 215 UNR deputies 
were Campngnor7s rle la Libe'ration, forty-cight held the Me'cluille de lu Rt -  
sistatrce, and fourteen held other resistance medals, for a total of 36 percent, 
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as opposed to 17 percent comparable medal holders within the Rassemble- 
merit Dkmocratique (a Radical reincarnation). I' The number of UNR medal 
holders was particularly impressive in view of the youth of the UNR 
deputies, many of whom were too young to have been in the resistance. 
If former resistants are numerous among Gaullist deputies, they have 
been even more common within the cabinet, and until recently had almost 
monopolistic control over the leadership of the UNR national organization. 
Among the twenty-six French ministers and secretaries of state in March, 
1965, six were members of the prestigious order of Compag17orzs de la 
Libtratioi~, and another nine held the Mtdaille de In Rtsistar7ce. Until 1967 
the key party decision-makers - Roger Frey, Jacques Chaban-Delmas, 
Michel DebrC, and Jacques Baumel among them - were almost all out of 
the resistance." 
To be sure, not all resistance heroes are Gaullists, and not all Gaullists 
leaders are resistance heroes. Yet within the UNR, those without resistance 
credentials (preferably Free French credentials) are always slightly suspect 
in the eyes of the old faithfuls. "In the world of Gaullism," writes Edmond 
Michelet, "there are the 'compagnons' and those who are not compagnons, 
have never been and will never be. When the RPF was at its highest tide, 
it attracted a certain number of members who adorned themselves with 
the title of compagr~n only out of opportunism."") As a governing party 
(at least in theory), the UNR undoubtedly has attracted more such "op- 
portunists." And even the new faithful are tiring of interminable references 
to a resistance which took place a generation ago.zo 
After the Algerian War, there appeared increasing evidence of a chang- 
ing of the guard within the Gaullist movement, as the UNR searched out 
able young candidates to appeal to the unusually young French electorate 
of the 1960's. Jean Charlot has calculated that "new Gaullists" -men 
without resistance decorations and without Gaullist leadership experience 
in the Fourth Republic - represented 29 percent of all UNR deputies in 
1958 and 40 percent in 1962. Within the party apparatus, as early as 1960 
over half of the UNR federation secretaries were "new Gaullists."" Indica- 
tive of the declining role of Gaullists of 1940-1944 in the UNR was de 
Gaulle's choice of Georges Pompidou, who was a postwar convert, to be 
premier and UNR leader. The founding congress of the UD-Ve in Novem- 
ber, 1967, heard only a few reminders of Gaullism's glorious past. Its focus 
clearly was on the future. When thc new UD-Ve's Central Committee was 
charged with selecting a secretary-general, it decided upon Robert Poujade, 
who was only sixteen years old when de Gaulle first entered liberated Paris. 
Among other important characteristics of UNR deputies in the first two 
parliaments (1959-19671, in comparison with deputies of other parties, 
are the following: they were less experienced in nationaI politics, younger, 
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and slightly more often from business and industry. In the fall of 1958, 
when 67 percent of all respondents in a national poll indicated that they 
wanted "new men" in parliament," it was natural enough that the legislative 
elections of November, 1958, should have produced a turnover of parlia- 
mentary personnel unprecedented in this century. The National Assembly 
elected in that year included only 131 hoIdovers out of 465 deputies from 
the me'ti-opole, plus another 48 former deputies or senators. Among the 
198 UNR deputies, only 16 were holdovers and another 27 former deputies 
or senators. As Mattei Dogan has shown, all but 27 of the UNR's "new 
men" had had some kind of political experience in the Fourth Republic, 
as parliamentary candidates (49), as party leaders (37), in quasi-political 
functions such as membership in ministerial cabinets (9), or in local po- 
litical office (33).;" Nonetheless, only 43 of the 198 UNR deputies elected 
in 1958, and 36 of the 229 elected in 1962 had ever sat in the parliament 
of the Fourth Rep~bl ic . ;~  
With a massive turnover in personnel, the average age of deputies drop- 
ped markedly in 1958, as it had after the Liberation. UNR deputies were 
the youngest of alI.:"he expansion of UNR ranks in the 1962 election 
brought in more young men, giving the UNR a delegation 53 percent of 
whom were under fifty years of age, as opposed to 44 percent in all other 
groups."- One-fifth of the UNR deputies were under forty, as opposed to 
one-fifteenth in all other party groups." With the reelection of many UNR 
incumbents in 1967, the average age of course increased. Still, however, 
the average age of UNR deputies (52 years) was below that of opposition 
Federation deputies (55) and Communist deputies (53)." It is most likely 
that the average age of Gaullist deputies was reduced by the elections of 
June, 1968, when 142 new deputies were elected under the official GaulIist 
label. 
As indicated in Table 1, the UNR delegation in the National Assembly 
included slightly fewer workers and farmers than the average in other 
parties and slightly more businessme~l and military officers. The contrast 
sharpened slightly in 1962, when the representation of the Communist 
Party (the majority of whose deputies are workers and employees) rose 
from ten to forty-one seats. Preliminary figures for the Assembly elected 
in 1967 indicate no striking changes in the occupational backgrounds of 
UNR deputies, although there was a decline in the proportion of workers 
and clerks."" 
The UNR deputies elected in 1962 were similar to the fifty Independent 
deputies (the traditional Right) in overall percentage of liberal professional 
men and businessmen, but significantly different in three respects."' While 
the Independents had no workers or employees among them, the UNR was 
at least represented here by seven percent of its delegation. Secondly, 
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TABLE 1 
PROFESSIONS OF U N  K DEPU I ITS ' 
1 11 
Workers & F'irmers 
Employcos 
(Industrj'. 
Apr~culture 
8. G o v ' ~ . )  
111 1 v  v 
L1ber.11 Bu51ness Off~cers. 
P r o f e s ~ ~ o n s  and Clergy, Totals 
Industry and 
Mlsc. 
UNR Deputies 11  ( 6 % )  13 (751) 1 I2 (57%) 54 (27%) 8 (4%) 198 
1958 
All non-UNR 
Deputies 267 20 (7%) 41 (15%) 152 (57%) 51 (19%) 3 (1%) 2~ 
UNR Deputies 16 ( 7 % )  13 ( 6 % )  114 (50%) 71 (31%) 15 (7%) 229 
1962 
All non-UNR 
Deputies 236 46 (19%) 29 (12%) 110 (51%) 39 (17%) 2 (1%) 465 
*Computed from dab In b f , ~ r t c ~  Dop'in. "Ch,~npemenr d e  rcglrne et cbangement de personnel," 
In Le Rrfererrdrrrr~ dc ~ r p l c r ~ r h r e  cr le> t ' l e~ l .o~r \  r l r  r r o ~ ~ r r r h r r ,  I 9 5 8  ("Cdhlers de  la Fondat~on  
Natlonale des S c l e n ~ e s  Polltlques," No. 109 P,rns, 1960), T,ible IX, p 267, and Matte] Dogan, 
"Note sur le nouveau personnel p,~rlemcnt.~~re." In Lc R<~jcrerr(llrr~r d'otrohre e l  lea rlecrrorzs de 
r~olerrrbre, I962 ("Cdhlers de Id Fond'itlon Nat~on'tle des S ~ l e n ~ e s  Pol~tlques," No 142 PATIS, 1965). 
Table, p 431 
eighteen percent of the independents (as opposed to only six percent of 
the Gaullists) were farmers. Thirdly, the majority of the UNR "business- 
men" (41 of 71) were managerial personnel, probably mostly with large 
corporations, whereas Independent "businessmen" were listed as "mer- 
chants" or "industrialists," many of whom undoubtedly were attached to 
family-owned enterprises. Again in comparison with the UNR group, the 
MRP delegation included more farmers (28%) and fewer professional men 
(36%), and the Radicals included more professional men (67%) and fewer 
businessmen (19%). In the character of the UNR group in the National 
Assembly, one sees some reflection of the UNR's emphasis on youth and 
new talent in politics, of its strength in urban areas, and of its interest in 
young managerial personnel. 
If these are the notables of Gaullism, what kinds of voters rally to the 
Cross of Lorraine? Restricting our attention to the Fifth Republic, a clear 
distinction must be made between what we shall term the "extended" and 
the "restricted" GaulIist electorates. The extended electorate is made up of 
that absolute majority of voters which has responded "yes" to de Gaulle 
in the great plebiscites of the Fifth Republic, notably the referendum of 
October, 1962, on the constitutional amendment providing for direct, pop- 
ular election of the President (when 62 percent of those voting voted 
"yes"), and which supported him in the first popular presidential election 
in December, 1965 (when de Gaulle won 55 percent of the votes in the 
second runoff ballot against Francois Mitterand). The smaller electorate 
(17.5%, 36.3%, and 38.2%) is composed of those voters who voted for 
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Gaullist candidates in the first ballot against a wide field of opponents in the 
legislative elections of 1958, 1962, and 1967 re~pectively.~' Some of the 
relevant social characteristics of both electorates will be summarized. 
Although survey data regarding the legislative elections of November, 
1958, suggested that younger voters - especially those in their thirties - 
tended to be slightly more attracted to the UNR than their e lder~ ,~Vater  
studies clearly indicate that in recent years both the restricted Gaullist 
electorate and the extended electorate (as shown in Table 2) have in- 
TABLE 2 
AGE OF GAULLIST VOTERS 
AGE GROUP 
-- 
21-34 35-49 50-64 65 and 
over 
Referendum, Yes: 43% 42% 49% 56% 
October, 1962 No: 28% 33% 29% 24% 
2nd Ballot, 
Presidential election, for de Gaulle: 49% 55% 55% 65% 
December, 1965 + for Mitterand: 51% 45% 45% 35% 
*From a jolnt FNSP ancl, IFOP nat~on?! survey, reported In Guy Michelet, "Attktudes et 
comportements poht~ques d l automne 1962, E l e c l ~ o ~ r i  1962, p. 207. Total5 of "blanc, nul," 
"n'a pas voti," and "sans r&p0nse7' ranged f f q ) n i  29 per $nt for the yopnpe-1 to 20 percent for the 
olde5t category 
**From a na t~onal  IFOP poll repard~ng vote ~ntentlons, conducted December 14-16, 1965, on the 
eve of the second ballot of December 17, 1965 Reported In Snfrriaqe~,  No. 4 (19651, special Issue 
ent~tletl, "L'Election pr(.sident~elle de decernbre 1965," p. 36. 
cluded a disproportionate number of older people. The restricted electorate, 
however, is more balanced than the extended electorate, perhaps because 
some older voters are willing to vote for de Gaulle personally, but are re- 
luctant to break a longstanding identification with a non-Gaullist party. 
According to a national survey of voting intentions in the first ballot of 
the November, 1962, elections, the UNR got almost its full share of votes 
from voters 21-34 years of age (28% to 31% in the total sample), and only 
slightly more than its share of voters age 65 and over (20% to 
A more striking characteristic of the Gaullist electorate is its large pro- 
portion of women. In the legislative elections of 1958 and 1962, the UNR 
apparently drew two percent more votes from women than from men, 
despite the fact that abstention from voting was almost twice as frequent 
among women as among men."' De Gaulle's 62 percent victory over the 
cartel des nons in the referendum of October, 1962, was due in large 
measure to feminine support, since national survey data indicate that women 
voted "yes" in a proportion of 50 percent to 20 percent (with the remainder 
staying at home, or being unwilling to divulge their vote), while among men 
de Gaulle won only some 42 percent "yes7' votes to 38 percent "no" 
votes." Again in the presidential erection of 1965, 61 percent of those 
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women who had made up their minds - as opposed to 49 percent of male 
respondents- declared they intended to vote for de Gaulle on the eve 
of the runoff b a l l ~ t . " ~  As in the case of age differentials, the extended elec- 
torate appears to be slightly less balanced than the restricted electorate. 
~t may well be that a direct two-option confrontation - especially between 
de Gaulle and the Left - tends to make temporary Gaullists of those many 
women who identify with the MRP (France's most openly Catholic party) 
or with the Independents, or with no party at all.G7 
With regard to reIigion, an IFOP survey conducted after the presidential 
election of December, 1965, discovered that among those respondents who 
identified themselves as "regular practicing Catholics," 66 percent had pre- 
ferred de Gaulle (as opposed to 8 percent for Mitterand), while among 
those who declared themselves "without religion," only 18 percent favored 
de Gaulle (as opposed to 72 percent for Mitterand). Nonetheless, de Gaulle 
won the support of 37 percent of self-declared "nonpracticing Catholics," 
and apparently retained his hold over many Protestant voters in A l ~ a c e , ~ ~  
demonstratin2 that Gaullism was not simply a neoclerical movement. 
Though relevant evidence is limited, it appears that the restricted electorate 
is only slightly less Catholic, despite its larger share of urban, male, and 
younger voters. In a national survey conducted three months before the 
March, 1967, elections, 70 percent of those respondents who intended to 
vote Gaullist on the first ballot were Catholics who practiced either regularly 
or from time to time. In contrast, 53 percent of those who intended to vote 
for the Federation of the Democratic and Socialist Left were either non- 
practicing Catholics or  nonbeliever^.^"' 
With respect to profession, the joint FNSP-IFOP election studies indicate 
that the distribution within the restricted Gaullist electorate is very much 
like that among French voters generally. In the first ballot of the 1958 
legislative elections, the UNR had its full share of workers (30%),  civil 
servants and employees (20%), artisans and merchants (17%), liberal pro- 
fessional men (7%), and rentiers (19%), and lagged behind the normal 
distribution (6% as opposed to 10%) only with regard to farmers and farm 
lab~rers.~"Rerrtiers are defined as persons who live off income from prop- 
erty, stocks, or other investments. The number of persons so classified here 
indicates that numerous retired persons were classified in this way.) With 
occupations categorized slightly differently in the FNSP-IFOP survey of 
voting on the first ballot of the 1962 legislative elections, the UNR again 
appears remarkably close to the national distribution among occupations. 
Only workers are significantly underrepresented (15 percent, as opposed 
to 20 percent so classified in the whole sample), and only retired persons 
are significantly overrepresented (17 percent as opposed to 12 percent).71 
A national survey taken three months before the 1967 elections revealed 
16 RICE UNIVERSITY STUDIES 
that 31 percent of the 515 workers polIed intended to vote Gaullist on the 
first ballot, as opposed to only 30 percent of that intention in the entire 
sample of 1,780 persons.'" 
Interestingly enough, the extended electorate diverges rather more seri- 
ously from the nationaI distribution of professions than does the restricted 
electorate. A clear majority of workers apparently voted "no" in the Octo- 
ber, 1962, referendum, while de Gaulle's plea for "the warm confidence 
of the Nation" was answered affirmatively by at least two-to-one majorities 
among merchants, housewives, and retired persons.'Vn the second ballot 
of the 1965 presidential election, an IFOP poll found that among those 
respondents who expressed an opinion, de Gaulle had the support of 67 
percent of merchants and industrialists, 63 percent of liberal professional 
men and high-level management personnel, 60 percent of retired persons, 
59 percent of farmers, and 55 percent of medium-level employees, but 
only 45 percent of workers." 
The extended electorate tends to absorb much of the traditional Right, 
as parties of the Left join to challenge de Gaulle. The restricted electorate 
is "rather representative of French diversity," however, both in its socio- 
economic composition and - to a lesser extent - in the political origins 
of its voters. Among the 114 UNR voters in the 796 person FNSP-IFOP 
sample of 1958, 2 admitted to having voted Communist in 1956, 7 had 
voted Socialist, 7 for Radicals, 15 for the MRP, 14 for Independents, 2 for 
Poujadists, 13 for Social Republicans (the GauIlist rump party), and 12 
had abstained.'Wf another 42 who declined to report their 1956 vote, some 
very likely voted for parties of the Left and were now - as Gaullists - re- 
luctant to admit that fact.;& Leaving this latter category aside, if one con- 
siders the MRP to be a party of the Center (a designation some would con- 
test), Gaullist acquisitions in 1958 appear to have come as much from the 
Left (Communist, Socialist, and - Left only in a traditional sense - Rad- 
ical) as from the Right (Independent and Poujadist). Even in the legislative 
elections of November, 1962, when the Independents dropped from 20.1 
percent of the vote in 1958 to 13.4 percent, the influx of UNR voters 
included many from the Left. The 1962 FWSP-IFOP survey found 400 
UNR first ballot voters in a sample of 1,534. Of these 400, 4 had voted 
Communist in 1958, 23 Socialist, 10 Radical, 51 MRP, 174 UNR, 50 
Independent, 9 for splinter parties, 30 had abstained, and 49 declined tc 
Even the extended Gaullist electorate is more catholic than its foes on 
the Left imply. In the October, 1962, referendum -despite the strong 
urging of their party - 7 percent of those voters who a month later voted 
Communist chose to acclaim de Gaulle with a "yes" vote. So also did 27 
percent of those who voted Socialist, 41 percent of those who voted Radical, 
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66 percent of the MRP voters, and 52 percent of the  independent^.'^ 
Similarly, on the eve of the second ballot of the December, 1965, presi- 
dential election, de Gaulle apparently had the support of some 14 percent 
of the Communist, Socialist, and Radical voters combined, and some 71 
percent of MRP and Independent voters (despite Jean Lecanuet's advice 
to his supporters to vote for Mitterand)."' On the basis of survey data and 
election returns, Franqois Goguel estimates that three million voters who 
had voted regularly for Communists, Socialists, or Radicals under the 
Fourth Republic voted for de Gaulle in the first ballot of the December, 
1965, elections.'" Clearly the center of balance of the extended electorate 
is right of center; yet Gaullism retains some appeal for discontented voters 
on the Left. 
In an old and relatively slow-changing country like France, where much 
is to be learned by studying traditional regional voting patterns, one needs 
only to view a map of recent voting results to note that Gaullism's unique- 
ness lies in its aIIiance between those bastions of rural traditionalism of the 
East (Alsace-Lorraine) and the West (Normandy, Brittany, and the Ven- 
die) on the one hand, and the economically dynamic regions of Northern 
France, where the tradition tends to be Leftist, on the other." Apart from 
scattered strongholds, the Massif Central and the South offer strong re- 
sistance to the Gaullist wave, perhaps, as Frangois Goguel has suggested, 
not simply because the South is economically backward (it is not consistently 
so), but also because it is the bearer of an older, more fiercely individual- 
istic, more ideological, and consistently Leftist political culture." Nonethe. 
less, the UNR and tlie UDR have done considerably better in the Midi 
than did the RPF in 195 1 .  On the first ballot of the legislative elections of 
June, 1968, Gaullist candidates won at least thirty percent of the vote 
in all but three of France's ninety-five departments. The combination of 
rural support in the West with urban support in the North gives the Gaullist 
electorate very close to a normal distribution between urban and rural 
voters, with the extended electorate slightly more rural than the restricted 
electorate.'' 
The Gaullist electorate, i t  appears, includes a broad cross-section of the 
French population. It differs from that cross-section - and usually only 
moderately - in that it contains a larger than average proportion of older 
people, women, devout Catholics, retired people, businessmen, former MRP 
and Independent voters, and people from the West, East, and North. In 
all respects considered, wc have found the extended Gaullist electorate to 
be more distinctive - and probably niore conservative - than the restrict- 
ed electorate.'' When de Gaulle himself does battle with the parties, his 
strongcst opposition now is from the Left, thus drawing conservatives into 
the Gaullist camp in order to prevent a revival of the dreaded Popular 
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Front. The legislative elections of 1958, 1962, and 1967 - and more clear- 
ly yet, the municipal elections of March, 1965, when the UNR succeeded 
in electing less than a tenth of all municipal councillors - '"clearly demon- 
strate that many who will vote for de Gaulle fail to transfer their loyalty to 
the party which claims him, but which is not always claimed in return. 
The dramatic rise of the UNR was facilitated by the comparative weak- 
ness of party identification in France in the late 1950's. As a dynamic new 
party, holding aloft the Cross of Lorraine, it attracted a large number of 
voters whose interest in politics and whose political loyalties were ~hallow."~ 
The proportion of respondents in IFOP surveys who identified with the 
UNR fluctuated from 11 percent in June, 1962, to 27 percent in December, 
1962 (at the time of the legislative elections), to 14 percent in June, 
1963.$; A study conducted by the SocittC Fran~aise d'EnquEtes par Sondage 
(SOFRES) in early 1966, however, revealed that the UNR was regarded 
with "beaucoup de sympathie" or " a s ~ e z  de syinpntlzie" by 6 percent of 
those who considered themselves to be of the extreme left, 22 percent of 
the moderate left, 66 percent of the center, 77 percent of the moderate 
right, 78 percent of the extreme right, and 40 percent of the apolitical 
marais." This level of support was far greater and broader than that of any 
other party, although the intensity of the Communist Party's strength among 
voters of the extreme left (47 percent of whom declared "beaucoup de 
sympathie" for it) was greater than the UNR enjoyed in any category. 
Along with its first-ballot votes of 38 percent and 43 percent respectively in 
the legislative elections of 1967 and 1968 (in this latter year not counting 
another 4 percent for Independent Republicans running without official 
Gaullist support), this evidence suggests that the Gaullist party gradually 
may be establishing those voter loyalties which alone can protect it against 
another electoral flash flood. 
On the basis of early reports of IFOP's preelection survey, it appears that 
the swelled Gaullist electorate of June, 1968, was very similar in social 
characteristics to de Gaulle's extended electorate. In comparison with the 
March, 1967, elections, the Gaullist parties in 1968 apparently drew a 
higher proportion of votes from women, from older persons, and from busi- 
nessmen. They made limited gains among white collar workers and farmers 
and none at all among workers."" In that crisis election, with the Gaullists 
expIoiting to the full popular fears of communism and chaos, for the first 
time the extended electorate swung behind Gaullist candidates on the first 
balIot, Yet undoubtedly many of those voters who joined the Gaullist land- 
slide of June, 1968, have only an ephemeral, faute de mieux kind of loyalty 
to the Gaullist movement. 
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IV. Factionnlism ancl Party Building 
Any French political party which hopes to win and to retain a parlia- 
mentary majority must learn to survive that traditional Gallic malady: 
factionalism. This disease played a major role in the demise of the RPF. I t  
continues to threaten the survival of the UDR. 
With its initial purpose the avoidance of competition between Gaullists 
in the legislative elections of November, 1958, the UNR was formed on 
October 1, 1958, as a federation of various Gaullist organizations, notably 
the RPF remnant, now called the C e ~ t r e  Ncrtior~crl des Re'pztblicans Socicrux 
(led by Roger Frey and Jacques Chaban-Delmas), the Unioi7 pour le 
Renouveau Frcinpis (led by Jacques Soustelle), and the Conventio17 Re'- 
publiccritze (led by Lion Delbecq~e) ."~ Roger Frey, Secretary-General of 
the Rip~~blicains Socicrrrx, was named to that same post in the UNR. Hardly 
had the new party come into being than its unity was severely tested over 
the question of electoral alliances. Soustelle, who had played a key role in 
turning the May 13, 1958, uprising in Algicrs toward de Gaulle, now hoped 
to wed the UNR to a grand alliance for the defense of French Algeria, in 
partnership with And& Morice, leader of the Centre Rtpirblicain, Roget 
Duchet, Secretary-General of the Centre Natior7nl des Ii-2dipendants (CNI), 
and Georges Bidault, leader of the dissident De'rnocratie Chre'tienne group. 
Secretary-General Roger Frey and several UNR Central Committee mem- 
bers, including Edmond Michelet, Jacques Chaban-Delmas, and Michel 
Debri, opposed such an alliance, largely on the grounds that it inevitably 
would saddle the UNR with a Right-wing image. The moderates forced a 
compromise, quite possibly with the help of de Gaulle, who sent Olivier 
Guichard as his emissary to the Central Committee. The motion adopted by 
the Central Committee stated that in order to avoid "the n~ultiplication of 
national and republican candidates and votes," the Secretary-General was 
being asked to "enter into contract with national political organizations, 
including the Centre Natiorinl cles Inrikpendants, the De'rnocratie CI7re'tienne, 
the Centre Re'publicaiii, and the Radical-Socialist Party.""' Frey was em- 
powered to conclude nonaggression agreements - without mutual commit- 
ment to French Algeria - with the Radical Socialists and others, as well 
as with the parties of the Right. 
This division within the UNR over Algerian policy - essentially over 
whether thc UNR sliould allow dc Gaullc a free hand, or whctlier it should 
press for integration of Algeria with France - continued to plague the 
party for the next three years. When Roger Frey became Min~ster of In- 
formation in early 1059, and was replaced by Albin Chalandon as UNR 
Secretary-General, the French Algcria faction, led by Lkon Delbccquc, 
turned on the new party chief as an obstacle to their policy goals. "11 faut 
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dichalandonner l'U.N.R.," wrote one of Delbecque's sympathizers, Ray- 
mond Dronne.'" The schism within the party deepened sharply following 
de Gaulle's historic speech of September 16, 1959, in which he offered the 
Algerian population an ultimate choice among three alternatives: "Franci- 
fication," association, or secession. Jacques Soustelle, about to leave for a 
tour of French possessions in the Pacific, shot off a letter to the UNR Cen- 
tral Committee asking the party to declare immediately in favor of la 
francisation. The Central Committee, meeting on September 18, voted 
simply to give full support to de Gaulle."' The next day four UNR deputies 
- Arrighi, Biaggi, Battesti, and Thonlazo -joined a newly created "Rally 
for French Algeria," despite a prior pledge taken by a11 UNR deputies not 
to join any other political organization during their term of office."' The 
following month, October, 1959, with an Algerian policy debate coming 
up in the National Assembly, the UNR parlianientary group in that cham- 
ber decided against commitment to any one of the three options, Nine UNR 
deputies promptly resigned from the party in protest.'" When four of these 
deputies returned hat in hand requesting readmission (there being little 
hope for political salvation outside the Gaullist church), they were met 
with a closed door and a promise of reexamination of their cases at the 
end of one year. 
The first UNR NationaI Congress, meeting in Bordeaux in November, 
1959, naturally became a battleground between the two major factions 
within the party, led for the moment by Jacques Soustelle (even though he 
was then a member of the government) and by Albin Chalandon. Soustelle 
was warmly acclaimed by the Congress. He had the enthusiastic support of 
the party organizations in Algeria and in thc departments of RhBne,Bouches 
du RhBne, and Meurthe-et-Moselle."'~ The Chalandon wing prevailed, how- 
ever, with French Algeria militants largely being kept off the party Cen- 
tral Committee. The final resolution, prepared in closed committee for the 
Congress' approval, simply declared "its total confidence in the person and 
the actions of General de Gaulle" and in his Algerian policy, while reaffirm- 
ing its desire to prevent "any form of secession" and to preserve "a tight 
union between the Me'tropole and Algeria.""' 
The rift within the party could not be patchcd over. The Week of the 
Barricades uprising in Algiers in January, 1960, found two UNR deputies 
in open support of the rebels."' Then on February 5, 1960, Jacques Sous- 
telle was dismissed from his position as Minister for the Sahara. When 
Soustelle continued to criticize de Gaullc's Algerian policy in public, he 
was expelled from the party in April, 1960. Four more deputies quit the 
UNR in sympathy with Soustelle, two of them from Soustelle's depart- 
ment of the RhBne."" The UNR federation of the RhBne cut all relations 
with the UNR headquarters in Paris; the federation of the Nord declared it- 
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self autonomous; and throughout the party membership Soustelle's many 
admirers were restless and disc~ntent. '~"The failure of UNR deputies to 
vote a motion on Algerian policy at the end of their study conference of 
September, 1960, indicated that party unanimity was still beyond reach on 
this q~esrion.'"~ Several more deputies resigned or were expelled over Al- 
gerian policy before the party's time of trouble ended.I0" 
Gradually de Gaulle solved the problem for the UNR. His mastery over 
the Algiers putsch of April, 1961, his overwhelming success in the two 
popular referenda on Algerian policy in January, 1961, and April, 1962, 
and - above all - his continuing hold over the electorate in the consti- 
tutional referendum of October, 1962, and in the legislative elections of 
November, 1962 (when all former UNR deputies who had left the fold 
were crushingly defeated), helped the party to restore its unity around the 
General. Soustelle clearly had been correct in the spring of 1960 when he 
objected that he could not have violated the UNR's Algerian policy since 
the party had taken no substantive policy stand. Throughout the war years, 
the UNR leadership remained fully aware that the party's own price of 
union was blind obedience to de GaulIe on Algeria. 
Once the French Algeria wing of the UNR had fled or been purged by 
the end of 1961, the most permanent cleavage within the party came to 
center on social and economic policy. Already in 1958 and 1959 UNR 
Secretary-General Albin Chalandon had pleaded - unsuccessfully - 
against the government's deflationary fiscal and economic policy.ln' By 
196 1, as resentment grew within the party over the government's tight cred- 
it policies, its restraints on wage increases (especially in the public sector), 
and its meager efforts in the social welfare field, first the UNR National 
Congress, then the Central Committee, and finally the party's Professional 
and Labor Action Association all urged the government to ease the eco- 
nomic plight of workers and civil servants. Perhaps the bitterest criticism 
from within the party came from the pen of the director of the party daily, 
Ln Nation. In a special issue of April 29, 1961, Joel Le Tac wrote a sting- 
ing editorial against "ce rkgime 21 la Guizot." "And to serve General de 
Gaulle," wrote Le Tac, "the man who after Liberation had accomplished 
a veritable social revolution, one saw thrown up a regime of bookkeepers, 
imperturbably aligning statistics in response to the demands of the work- 
e r ~ . " ' ~ '  Le  Tac subsequently was forced to resign as Departmental Secre- 
tary of the UNR Union of the Seine, even though Albin Chalandon came 
to his support. 
The potential for conflict within the Gaullisr camp over economic policy 
was increased measurably as a result of the legislative elections of Novem- 
ber, 1962. Following a clash with the National Assembly in October, 1962, 
de Gaulle determined to seek a reliable parliamentary majority in the en- 
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suing elections. Andrt Malraux, de Gaulle's representative for the occasion, 
offered the Gaullist name and, in most cases, exclusive Gaullist candidacy, 
not only to the UNR candidates but also to Gaullists of the Left and to 
certain Independents and Popular Republicans who consented to accept 
the label - and the ensuing Gaullist discipline - of the Association of 
the Fifth Republic. Following a Gaullist electoral victory, the Democratic 
Union of Labor (UDT), the Gaullists of the Left, quickly fused with the 
UNR in what now, in December, 1962, officially became the UNR-UDT. 
The UNR-UDT fusion brought into the government party such long- 
standing Gaullists as Rent Capitant, Louis Vallon, and Jean de Lipkowski, 
creators of the first Gaullist party, the Ui~ion Ga~illiste, in 1946. Wirhout 
organizational unity or substantial cooperation from the UNR, Gaullists of 
the Left had drawn less than one percent of the vote in 1958 and had failed 
to elect a single deputy. They fused with the UDT in April, 1959, recruited 
a membership of some two thousand (largely in Paris), published a bi- 
weekly, Notre Re'publique, and kept alive an economic and social critique 
from within the greater Gaullist family.lOTheir decision to fuse with the 
UNR was based partially on the hope that they could be more influential 
from within, and partially on de Gaulle's determination that "the Left must 
be present in Gaullism and Gaullism in the Left."'"De Gaulle is said to 
have encouraged and even arbitrated eRorts toward fusion. 
With the help of the Fifth Republic label, the UDT elected fourteen 
deputies in November, 1962, then, merging with the UNR, ceased to exist 
as an organization. In return, its leaders were relatively well treated, Louis 
Vallon became Rnpporteur Ge'i?&rnl of the Finance Committee in the Na- 
tional Assembly; RenC Capitant was named President of the National As- 
sembly's Committee on Laws; and two UDT leaders were appointed min- 
isters, Jean Sainteny as Minister of Veterans, and Gilbert Grandval (a 
holdover) as Minister of Labor.'" Within the party organization, UDT 
leaders such as LCo Hamon, Jean-Claude Servan-Sclireiber, RenC Caille, 
Pierre Billotte, and Gilbert GrandvaI have been active and influential in 
a variety of positions. The UDT biweekly, Notre RCpublique, now became 
an official UNR-UDT organ, although its editors remained unchanged and 
it continued to press vigorously for social and economic reforms. The UDT 
element lost some of its force within the UNR after the March, 1967, elec- 
tions, in which Vallon was defeated. The Left Gaullist contingent survived, 
however, strengtliened by the association with the reorganized Gaullist 
parliamentary group of such reform-minded ministers as Edgar Faure, 
Minister of Agriculture, Edgard Pisani, Minister of Equipment, and Louis 
Joxe, Minister of J u s t i ~ e . ' ~ ~  
Until 1967, Gaullists of the Left had rather limited impact on Gaullist 
economic policy. In January, 1966, Giscard d'Estaing finally gave way to 
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Michel Debrd as Finance Minister after de Gaulle's disappointingly narrow 
victory in the presidential elections of December, 1965; yet DebrC must 
have seemed a very modest improvement to Louis Vallon and RenC Cap- 
ifant.lOWinor reforms were enacted in 1965 concerning corporation law 
and labor-management "enterprise committees," but the UDT's hopes for 
reconstruction of capitalism through the "association of capital and labor" 
(an old Gaullist theme) met resistance and delay at the hands of DebrC and 
the economically conservative Pompidou government. It was only through 
de Gaulle's personal intervention, reportedly against the desires of the cab- 
inet and the bureaucracy, that a compulsory profit-sharing plan finally was 
enacted into law in the summer of 1967.1'0 
Often the former UDT leaders have been disappointed, as when the 
Action Committee nominated only a few Gaullists of the Left alongside 
numerous conservatives for the 1967 legislative elections; occasionally they 
have threatened a split in order to speed up social and economic reform."' 
When the March, 1967, elections produced a reduced and more conserva- 
tive Gaullist majority in the National Assembly, RenC Capitant first charged 
in a Notre Rkpi~blique editorial that ". . . in effect the government has con- 
ducted a rightist policy in the economic and social fields . . . ," and then 
chose for himself an "attached" (apparent&) rather than a membership 
status in the Gaullist parliamentary group.llWhen Pompidou and the party 
leadership called a congress at Lille in November, 1967, for the purpose 
of reorganizing and expanding the party, Capitant and Vallon trumpeted 
in a Nobe Re'publique headline, "We will not go to Lille."T1q Notre R t -  
publique's formal objection was to Pompidou's attempt "to incarcerate 
the regime in a party." One would suspect that a more Leftist-looking party 
would have appeared less dangerous to Vallon and Capitant. 
Although a few small Left Gaullist groups joined the Notre Rtpubliq~ie 
boycott, notably the Front Travailliste (led by Lucien Junillon) and the 
Front du Progrks (led by Jacques Dauer), others of similar persuasion at- 
tended the Lille congress, among them Pierre Billotte, Leo Hamon, Philippe 
Dechartre (Secretary-General of the Union de la Gauche Ve Rdpublique) 
and Robert Grossmann (President of the Union des Jeunes pour le Progrks). 
The new UD-Ve took a strong step toward reconciliation with the dissi- 
dent Left Gaullists when it selected as the party's first Secretary-General 
Robert Poujade, a choice applauded by both Notre Rdplrbliq~fe and the 
Front du Progrks."' This latter group was eventually lured into formal af- 
filiation with the UD-Ve in the spring of 1968. 
The partisan loyalties of Left Gaullists were tried almost to the breaking 
point during the massive strikes and demonstrations which shook de Gaullc's 
Republic in May and June, 1968. Rend Capitant had long predicted that 
the conservative economic policies of the Pompidou government would in- 
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crease working class grievances. When the Federation of the Democratic 
and Socialist Left posed a motion of censure in the midst of the general 
strike, Capitant resigned his seat in parliament rather than support the 
Pompidou government. Again, as on lesser issues in the past, de Gaulle 
gave support to Capitant's demands for social and economic reform, On 
May 31, 1968, Capitant became Minister of Justice in a reformulated gov- 
ernment which also included such Left Gaullist leaders as Yvon Morandat 
(President of the Front Travailliste), Philippe Dechartre (President of the 
Union de la Gauche Ve RCpublique), and Albin Chalandon (a longstanding 
spokesman for reformists among Gaullist party regulars). All but Morandat, 
who was defeated in his constituency, were kept on after the June, 1968, 
elections. They were joined in the new cabinet by Jean de Lipkowski and 
Jacques Trorial, both members of the Union de la Gauche Ve RCpublique. 
Violent pressure from students, workers, and the formal Left opposition 
parties apparently reaffirmed de Gaulle's conviction that "the Left must be 
present in Gaullism and Gaullism in the Left." De Gaulle's proposed solu- 
tion to the social crisis of May, 1968 - greater mass "participation" in the 
administration of economic and governmental affairs - was reminiscent of 
a score of Notre R&publique editorials. 
Recalling both their premerger weakness and de Gaulle's desire that 
they remain in the fold, Left Gaullists usually feel that, at least for the time 
being, they are more influential within the UDR, where they have found 
numerous kindred spirits, than ~ u t s i d e . ~ ~ ~ h o s e  Left Gaullists who remain 
outside the UDR, notably the members of the Front Travailliste, have 
little hope for power and influence save insofar as de Gaulle and the UDR 
choose to call upon them. 
There is indeed still a Left wing within the UDR, a wing which despised 
the fiscal policies of Giscard d'Estaing, and which looks upon Michel DebrC 
and Georges Pompidou with some suspicion. Though Notre Re'publique 
speaks most consistently for that wing, it is not infrequently joined by UDR 
leaders of the stripe of the editor, Jacques de Montalais, of the UDR 
daily."" 
One must not exaggerate the strength and unity of the Left wing, how- 
ever, A study of roll-call votes in the hectic last half of the spring, 1965, 
session of the National Assembly revealed no solid opposition group within 
the UNR delegation. From April 27, 1965, to June 26, 1965, as the gov- 
ernment pushed through the Assembly important bills on national military 
service, tax reform, reform of corporation law, and revision of the conzith 
d'entrepri.w, the dissenters and abstainers within the UNR group tended 
to vary from question to question. In a total of thirty-eight roll-call votes, 
six UNR deputies - Lecornu, Meunier, Schwartz, Taittinger, Vallon, and 
ZilIer - dissented or abstained from the majority UNR position on four 
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or more occasions. Another fifteen UNR deputies (out of a total of 215 
full members) dissented or abstained three times."' Apart from a meat 
marketing bill, on which thirty-two UNR deputies voted against the majority 
position and three more abstained (many apparently in defense of local 
interests),'ls the largest number of dissenters came on a bill requiring cor- 
porations to inform stockholders of directors' salaries (eighteen against and 
three abstaining), one allowing certain stockholders a plural vote in speci- 
fied circumstances (twenty-three against and one abstaining), and another - 
again on the question of the stockholders7 right to information - requiring 
corporation executives to provide detailed accounts of salaries and expenses 
(twenty-one for and four abstaining, with most UNR deputies now op- 
p~sed ) .~ 'V l though  one might have expected the first of these roll calls 
(threatening corporation secrecy) to bring out a "Right wing" opposition, 
and the last two to reveal a "Left wing" opposition on economic policy, 
in fact, the "Right wingers" were mosfly obedient on other votes, and, of 
the supposed "Left wingers," only Louis Vallon, RenC Capitant, and Fran- 
qois Le Douarec show up as dissenters or abstainers on both of the last- 
mentioned roll calls. Though there may have been a more or less cohesive 
Left wing at work behind the scenes, when the final votes were called, UNR 
deputies tended to close ranks. Those who did dissent or abstain from the 
group position varied greatly from question to q ~ e s t i 0 n . l ~ ~  
Unlike the UDT, those thirty-five Independents who were elected under 
the Gaullist label in 1962 established a separate parliamentary group, the 
Independent Republicans, which remained outside the UNR. While rather 
faithfully delivering their votes to give the government an absolute majority 
after the 1962 election, the Independent Republicans distinguished them- 
selves from many of their UNR partners by their attachment to Europcan 
political integration, to economic liberalism, and to a revival of parliamen- 
tary powers."' Again in contrast to the UDT, until 1967, when they elected 
several young men, almost all Independent Republican deputies were ex- 
perienced politicians who had built local political bases and who had been 
elected to the National Assembly in 1958 or earlier without the Gaullist 
label.12Tar from seeking admission to the UNR, the Independent Repub- 
lican leader (and former Finance Minister) ValCry Giscard d'Estaing insists 
that his is a "reflective," not an unconditional Ga~ll isni ;"~ he and his col- 
leagues declare themselves "loyal but not servile partners of the UNR."'?' 
Their announced goal is "to become the majority of the majority.""' In 
pursuit of high ambitions for himself and the Giscarrliens, during the year 
following his replacement as Finance Minister in January, 1966, Giscard 
d7Estaing made extensive political tours of France, established a national 
"Federation of Independent Republicans," created a series of clubs entitled 
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"Perspectives et RCalitCs" (in accordance with current French political fash- 
ions), and fought hard, though unsuccessfulIy, for the right to run Inde- 
pendent Republicans against other Gaullist candidates on the first ballot 
of the iegislative elections of March, 1967 .12~ols te red  by an impressive 
victory in those elections, which raised their Assembly strength from thirty 
to forty-four seats at a time when the Gaullist majority as a whole was 
being reduced from 284 to 244 seats, the Independent Republicans fended 
off all post-election pressures for a merger with the UNR. By the summer of 
1967, Giscard d'Estaing was publicly criticizing the government over for- 
eign policy, deficit spending, and policy making without "the necessary con- 
~ u l t a t i o n . " ~ ~ ~  
The crisis of May and June, 1968, shook the loyalty of Gaullism's Right 
wing just as it temporarily alienated portions of the Left wing. In the midst 
of the crisis, on May 30, 1968, Giscard called for the formation of a new 
government, that is to say one without Ponipidou. In the legislative elec- 
tions of June, 1968, the Independent Republicans ran a separate slate of 
candidates on the first ballot, challenging official Gaullist candidates in 
fifty-two districts. They expanded their share of Assembly seats from 
forty-four to sixty-one in those elections; yet the UDR (campaigning under 
the nom de guene of the Union for the Defense of the Republic) emerged 
with 292 out of 487 seats - a strong majority even without the votes of In- 
dependent Republican deputies. In early summer of 1968 there were no 
signs that Giscard was preparcd to abandon the fight for the succession. One 
day his followers would be needed again. 
Apart from the Giscm-ciier7s, who pose the most serious threat to Gaullist 
unity, Gaullists of all political stripes gradually are being drawn into a 
single party. With Premier Georges Ponipidou presiding, an Action Com- 
mittee for the Fifth Republic dcsignated an official Gaullist candidate in 
each district - not always the Gaullist incumbent - for the legislative 
elections of March, 1967. These official candidates - a number of them 
from outside the UNR - proceeded to crush all but one of the several 
dozen dissident Gaullists who ran against the Committee's designees, leav- 
ing Gaullist deputies with one more reminder of the risks of revolt.'2s Fol- 
lowing the elections, the UNR parliamentary group renamed itself the 
"Democratic Union for the Fifth Republic" and absorbed most of those 
successful Fifth Republic candidates who had been lured away from the 
Radicals and the Popular Republicans. In November, 1967, the UNR na- 
tional organization followed suit. At a party congress convened at Lille, 
unconditional Gaullists of twenty-five ycars standing shared the platform 
with such new converts as Edgar Faure and Maurice Schumann. The new 
Union D6mocratique pour la Ve RCpublique, which emerged out of the 
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Congress, had succeeded in shaking off a few more of the exclusive, sect- 
like characteristics which long had hampered the expansion of the Gaullist 
movement. Only the Independent Republicans and a few small Left Gaul- 
list groups remained organizationally outside the fold. During the legislative 
election campaign of June, 1968, further efforts were made to draw prom- 
inent politicians into the Gaullist coalition, the Union for the Defense of the 
Republic. 
Apart from the usual rivalries among party leaders, the most permanent 
cleavage within the UDR - and more pronouncedly within the extended 
Gaullist majority - now centers on social and economic policy. So Iong 
as de Gaulle remains on the scene to arbitrate and to force agreement, as 
he had done through his indirect intervention in the Action Committee for 
the Fifth Republic and through his strong public statement on Gaullist 
unity on October 28, 1966, there is littIe danger of schism.12"s Ren6 Cap- 
itant has written, the present unity of the UDR ". . . is strongly favored 
by the presence of General de Gaulle at the head of Gaullism. Still today 
as in the past, from him come political drive and leadership, and arbitration 
in the domain of organization, where personalities are in~olved . ' '~ '~  When 
the supreme arbiter retires, Gaullist unity at last will become dependent 
upon compromise and adjustment. 
V. Organization 
If the UDR is to survive de Gaulle it must not only prevent fragmenta- 
tion, but must also build an organization with solid local roots. The party's 
record in this regard is a mixed one. 
As is fitting for a party which borrows from both the Left and the 
Right, the UDR falls neatly neither into the traditional category of "cadre- 
type party" nor into that of "mass-type party."'" As in the cadre party, de- 
tailed programmatic commitments are avoided, and decision making within 
the UDR tends to be the affair of a rather small clique of men. Unlike the 
cadre party, the UDR is highly centralized and disciplined. In terms of 
membership, there has been no massive recruitment drive, such as the one 
which won the RPF a million members in 1948. Yet with a formal mem- 
bership which grew to over eighty thousand by 1963, at a time when French 
party membersliips generally were low, the UNR became much more 
of a mass organization than typical French cadre parties like the Radicals 
and the Independents."Moreover, after an initial fear of flooding the party 
with French Algeria partisans (as Delbecque and Soustellc desired),"" 
UNR leaders used study circles, forums, cadre schooIs, women's, youth, 
agricultural, and student clubs, and a variety of other techniques in order 
to catch a larger proportion of the population in the party's organizational 
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net. In February, 1967, the recently elected Secretary-General of the UD-Ve 
called for a new membership drive, with major emphasis on the South. 
At least for the moment the organization character of the UDR is better 
described, as RenC Rtnlond characterizes it, as a "government party."'," 
Created to organize popular and parliamentary votes in support of an exist- 
ing Gaullist government, the UDR has enjoyed adequate sanctions and re- 
wards to enforce discipline, and has staved off factions like that of SousteIle 
and Delbecque which would commit the party to specific programs and 
hence perhaps embarrass the government. Like the national organization 
of the British Conservative Party, the UDR organization is designed not 
to make policy decisions, but rather to mobilize support for those who do. 
The organizational structure of the UD-Ve, as the party outside parlia- 
ment is still called for the moment, was determined by the Lille C\>ngress 
in November, 1967. It builds from the legislative district organization (the 
base unit) to the Departmental Union, to the National Congress (Assises), 
which meets every two years. At the national level, the pyramid builds from 
the National Congress to the National Council, with six hundred members, 
meeting approximately every year, to the Central Committee, with one 
hundred members, meeting theoretically every month, to the Executive 
Bureau, which contairls some twenty-five members and meets weekly in 
principle. A portion of the members of each body is elected from below; 
another portion sits by right of elective or appointive office; and - in the 
ease of the Central Co~nn~ittee and Executive Bureau -a certain number 
are co-opted. 
As Jean Charlot has noted, when party ministers and deputies are numer- 
ous, as has been the case in recent years, the nonelected members are able 
to dominate all national party organs save, conceivably, the National Con- 
gress.' '' Although the National Congress has never escaped government con- 
trol on an important issue, on occasion it has served as a forum for active 
debate. The Congress at Bordeaux in 1959 was the scene of a major intra- 
party battle over Algerian policy. The 1961 Congress at Strasbourg was 
more orderly, yet witnessed vigorous dcbate over social and economic pol- 
icy. For the next five years, both the National Congress and, to a lesser 
extent. the National Council, served primarily to rouse enthusiasm anlong 
party workers, to demonstrate party unity, and to sprcad the UNR message 
to the general public. In this period, with party leaders preparing the 
script, these larger party organs tended to suppress conflict, although, to be 
sure, there was now somewhat less conflict to suppress. 
The Ljlle Congress of 1967 - the founding Congress of the UD-Ve - 
displayed renewed signs of independence. After long discussion, the Statutes 
Committee at that Congress amended the new party name proposed by 
party leaders - "L'Union des Ddmocrates Sociaux pour la Vc Rbpublique" 
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-on the grounds that the word "social" was unnecessary and overused.136 
There were also less successful objections to the admission to membership 
of longstanding critics of Gaullism, as well as to election of the national 
party Secretary-General by the Central Committee rather than by the 
National Congress. 
In higher party circles, before 1967 there was a tendency for the mem- 
bership of each body to expand and for decisions to be left in the hands of 
the next higher, and less unwieldy, authority. Even the supreme party ex- 
ecutive organ of the UNR, the Political Commission, rarely took decisions 
on its own initiative, either of a policy or administrative nature.lfi Though 
party organs, especially at thc higher levels, undoubtedly have had some 
long range influence on government policy (as in RenC Capitant's pressure 
for reforms of the co~nitPs d'e~lfrcprise), Minister of Veterans' Affairs Ray- 
mond Triboulet was probably truthful, if unnecessarily blunt, when he told 
a noisy assen~bly of delegates at the 1961 UNR National Congress, "You 
should know that motions voted by a congress have never changed anything 
whatsoever in the policy of a government.""' Policy decisions are ultimately 
the affair of the government, and organizational decisions the affair of the 
party secretariat working closely with such key party leaders as Georges 
Pompidou, Roger Frey, Jacques Chaban-Delmas, Michel DebrC, and presi- 
dential aides such as Olivier Guichard and Jacques Foccart. And in both 
organizational decisions and especially in policy decisions, de Gaulle is 
final arbiter. 
The UD-Ve administrative apparatus is now equally centralized. Soon 
after former RPF Secretary-General Jacques Baumel was chosen by the 
Central Committee to be the sixth Secretary-General of the UNR in Decem- 
ber, 1962, the manner of selecting departmental secretaries was changed 
from elections from below to appointment by the Secretary-General.13"n 
the course of the next thirty months, approximately two-thirds of all depart- 
mental secretaries were rep la~ed . '~~ '  With efficiency the goal, many faithfuI 
old Gaullists, who tended to look upon the party as a closed and private 
congregation, were asked to step aside. Although resistance was met in some 
departmental unions, as in Vaucluse, PyrknCes Orientales, HCrault, and 
Gard (where the old departmental secretary refused replacement and took 
his organization - files and all - with him out of the party), in the main 
Baumel and his secretariat were able to tighten controls over the entire 
party administration."' At his service in the well-equipped UNR head- 
quarters in Paris, BaumeI had a staff of approximately fifty, not including 
secretaries. Though all of these men had another occupation, several were 
government employees effectively on loan to the party headquarters. A 
score of party representatives (charge's en missiolz) toured the country, help- 
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ing to construct and to strengthen Iocal and departmental party organiza- 
tions. 
In 1967 and 1968 the party's top administrative structure was twice 
reformed. In May, 1967, Baumel stepped down in favor of a collegial five- 
man national secretariat. Georges Pompidou and Roger Frey became the 
actual though unofficial party leaders. When the new UD-Ve statutes re- 
stored the single party executive, the Executive Committee chose Robert 
Poujade, one of the five reigning national secretaries, to be General Sec- 
retary. Poujade in turn kept on three of his four colleagues in the national 
secretariat: Jean Charbonnel as an assistant secretary-general in charge of 
economic and social questions and of relations with associated organiza- 
tions; RenC Tomasini as Secretary for the National Congress and the Na- 
tional Council; and Jean Taittinger as Treasurer.llVoujade comgleted his 
team with Jean Valleix, in charge of internal party organization, and Michel 
Herson, whose specialty was to be the preparation of elections. 
The task of organization is far from complete, however. As Jacques 
Baumel admitted after the failure of the UNR assault on the local positions 
of the older parties in the municipal elections of March, 1965, in many 
areas ". . . the UNR-UDT is practically nonexistent at the base.""' After 
those elections, with the conviction that time is on the side of the Gaul- 
lists, Minister of Interior Roger Frey commented (not altogether accurately) 
that at the beginning of the Third Republic, "it took the Republicans fifty 
years" to gain control of the communes of France.Iil 
Despite its centralized character, the UDR cannot always be assured of 
controlling its locally elected officeholders. To be sure, the presence of 
de Gaulle at the head of the state lends unity to the party, yet, as we have 
seen, a diversity of views contend on economic and social policies. Were 
de Gaulle no longer on the scene, those UDR deputies with strong local 
support would have little need for the party in order to win reelection. For 
example, Jacques Chaban-Delmas, Mayor of Bordeaux and President of 
the National Assembly, is considerably stronger in the department of Gir- 
onde than is his party. Chaban-Delmas retains a secure political base in 
Bordeaux, even though the UNR's share of the ten-seat Gironde deleg7t' ion 
has dropped from seven in 1958 to five in 1962 to three in 1967.' I' At the 
commune level as well as at the legislative district level, Gaullist electoral 
success in Gironde has come in large part through focusing on personal- 
ities rather than on parties."" Elsewhere, in the district of Sarthe, the intelli- 
gent and effective deputy-mayor of SablC, Joel Le Theule (now a government 
minister), was reelected on the first ballot in November, 1962, in March, 
1967, and again in June, 1968, even though in 1965 the UD-Ve could boast 
no more than nine dues-paying members in his entire district.lK So long as 
single-member districts are retained, and so long as men like Chaban-Del- 
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mas and Le Theule can maintain the personal confidence of their districts 
(through attention to local necds in the old Radical style of the Third Re- 
public, quips Le Theule), the central party will have dificulty imposing tight 
discipline in a post-Gaullist era. And those many UDR deputies who have 
no strong local base may have ditliculty surviving the passing of de Gaulle. 
On organizational matters as on questions of economic policy, UD-Ve 
Ieaders frequently are not of one mind. The second UNR Secretary-General, 
Albin Chalandon, and the sixth, Jacques Baumel, greatly valued such paral- 
lel activities as colloquia, study groups, and clubs, whereas the third man in 
that post, Jacques Richard, gave more attention (with rather meager results) 
to auxiliary organizations for workers, farmers, merchants, and other occu- 
pational groups.ll' While Minister of the Interior, Roger Frey (whose en- 
thusiasm for colloquia and clubs was considerably less than that of BaumeI 
and his staff) proposed that the essential task in party organization was to 
open the UNR to "those on the Right and on the Left who have not yet 
joined us," and to transform it into "an organized. structured party, such 
as conceived by the Anglo-Saxons.""" ApparentIy this Frey proposal of 
March, 1965, was launched without prior consultation with Baumel and 
his staff."" The UNR Deputy General-Secretary for Organization and Im- 
plantation, Claude Labbd, questioned the propriety of strict discipline in 
a party seeking to hold a diverse majority together, and preferred recruit- 
ment of the voters of other parties rather than of their  politician^.'^" In 1967 
the Frey proposal for "opening" of the party was implemented at the Lille 
Congress, but not before Baumel had been removed as Secretary-General. 
It may well be that once again the presence of de Gaulle as a potential 
final arbiter prevented a more serious factional dispute." 
One of the key organizational problems for any parry which gains a share 
of power in a parliamentary system concerns relations between the govern- 
ment, the parliamentary party, and the national party structure. 111 the case 
of the UDR, the relationship between party and parliamentary group so 
far has presentcd no serious problem. So long as such key figures in the 
government as Frey, Debr6, and de Gaulle's representatives keep a strong 
hand over both party and parlian~entary group, there can be no real conflict 
between them. I11 theory, the bylaws of the UNR National Council pro- 
vided that one of that body's duties was "to inform and to supervise the 
action of the Pariiamentary Groups of the National Assembly and of the 
In practice, the UNR group in the National Assembly seemed to 
consider itself to be the party, as the British parliamentary parties tend 
to do."& 
More difficult by far than relations between party and deputies have been 
those between the UNR group, now the UDR group, in the National 
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Assembly and the government."Parliamentary grievances were sharply 
voiced over the government's Algerian policy and over its behavior during 
the miners' strike of 1963. More significant are the repeated pleas from 
the UDR benches for an end to the government's cavalier treatment of its 
supporters in the National Assembly. Among the critics have been such 
prominent UDR deputies as Jacques Chaban-Delmas, President of the 
National Assembly, RenC Tomasini, a. national UD-Ve secretary, Achile 
Peretti, formerly a vice-president of the UNR group in the National As- 
sembly, Joe1 Le Tac, then Director of La Nation, and Raymond Schmitt- 
lein, then President of the UNR group in the National Assembly. In 1960, 
Chaban-Delmas warned that "it is necessary that there be established be- 
tween the Government and Parliament a relationship which admits the real 
existence of Parliament." He  added that "an Executive without true par- 
liamentary controls leads gradualIy to arbitrary action and to dictator- 
ship.""" In sharper tones, he protested in mid-1961 that the government 
was behaving like "an autocrat, arrogating to itself full powers the better to 
abuse them, especially by preventing, through its control of the agenda, the 
discussion of any private member's bill and indeed any subject desired by 
the representatives of the nation."fii In a similar vein, at a study conference 
for UNR deputies held at Pornichet in September, 1961, RenC Tomasini 
regretted the absence of a true dialogue between government and parlia- 
ment. In three years, he noted, only 21 out of 496 bills proposed by depu- 
ties had been placed by the government on the Assembly's agenda, while 
206 out of 273 government bills had been adopted."' When Tomasini's 
colleagues joined in, asking for more government attention to parliament, 
Prime Minister MicheI DebrC retorted angrily that his critics were men of 
"frustrated ambitions," and that he refused to be "a President of the Coun- 
cil of the Fourth Republic."'"' Raymond Schmittlein, President of the UNR 
group in the Assembly, seemed to be joining the critics when later in the 
same meeting he argued that though the UNR must generally support the 
Government, ". . . the turtle-shelled telhnocrats must cease to dominate 
the regime. Civil servants have too much importance, and if I'intendance 
ne suit pns, it is because political necessities are not being taken enough into 
account.""'" Perhaps the most violent Gaullist critique of the government 
came from the pen of Joel Le Tac in the special La Natioiz editorid men- 
tioned above. Wrote Le Tac, "Its [the UNR's] role should not be limited to 
filling the stage, to amusing the gallery, between two television appear- 
ances of General de G a ~ l l e . " ~ ~ ~  
Particularly in the first Assembly, from 1959 to 1962, morale among the 
UNR deputies frequently was low. Absenteeism was a continual problem, 
as deputies frequently felt that attendance made little difference."? Even 
Gaullist deputies were not unaffected by a proud and long-standing French 
TO SURVIVE DE GAULLE 33 
parliamentary tradition which militated against placid acceptance of gov- 
ernment policy making, British style. Part of the problem was solved by 
the ending of the Algerian War and by the replacement of the brusque 
Debrt with the more tactful Pompidou, who promised that the UNR group 
had an important role to play in helping to formulate legislation.lm In  the 
second Assembly, from 1962 to 1967, the government gave more attention 
to majority deputies, especially when they presented their amendments be- 
hind the scenes, as in parliamentary committees or party subject groups, 
or through the parliamentary party's "bureau politique.""'" 
If the still heterogeneous UNR group was more unified in the second 
Assembly than in the first, the credit is due partially to Henry Rey, deputy 
from the Loire-Atlantique and president of the group since May, 1963, with 
the exception of a few weeks in June and July of 1968, when he served as a 
Minister of State."sUnlike some of his predecessors, Rey did not display 
his personal ambitions in such a way as to arouse the jealousy and sus- 
picion of his peers. Though seemingly an ir7cor7ditioilnel to the outside 
world, he was flexible and allowed free discussion in the forty-man ~ U ~ ~ N U  
of the group, where most group decisions are effectively made.'" His talent 
for reaching agreement, plus the government's frequent willingness to ac- 
cept carefully formulated amendments, had restored some decorum to the 
UNR group by the end of the second Assembly. 
At the beginning of the third Assembly, the government's decision in 
April, 1967, to demand a wide range of delegated legislative powers clearly 
revived resentment among Gaullist deputies over the meagerness of the 
powers left to them. Edgard Pisani resigned from the cabinet in protest 
against the delegated powers de~ision."~' The Independent Republican group 
accepted that decision only under great and prolonged protest. Albin Chal- 
andon most likely is correct in suggesting that on this point, as on many 
others, Giscard was only "saying out loud what otliers [UD-Ve deputies] 
are whispering.""" By the end of June, 1967, Pompidou was complaining 
of the "intolerable" and "inadmissiblc" attitude of some majority deputies.lG9 
Another source of antasonism between the Gaullist parliamentary group 
and the government was de Gaulle's long-standing preference for a non- 
partisan cabinet. To the frequent annoyance of UDR deputies. de Gaulle 
has been most reluctant to allow the major government party to be a gov- 
erning party. Throughout the life of the first Assembly the U N R  nevcr held 
a majority of the posts in the government. In the second Assembly, from 
1962 to 1967, they enjoyed only a narrow majority of ministries, with such 
key posts as foreign affairs and (until January, 1966) finance in the hands 
of civil servants, Independents, and a declining representation from other 
parties."" When Michel Debri. was set aside as Prime Minister in April, 
1962, de Gaulle chose as his successor, and presunlably majority party 
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leader, a banker, Georges Pompidou, who was not even a UNR member. 
Pompidou increasingly played the rcle of party leader, and after 1964 or 
1965 was generally so recognized. At the height of his prestige within the 
party, following the sweeping Gaullist victory in the legislative elections of 
June, 1968, Pompidou was summarily dismissed by President de Gaulle to 
make way for Maurice Couve de Murville, a dedicated diplomat and civil 
servant who, like most other ministers, had given scant attention to party 
affairs. 
In the legislative elections of March, 1967, and June, 1968, ministers at 
last were required to present themselves as Gaullist candidates for parlia- 
ment. Twenty-six of the twenty-eight ministers ran under the Fifth Republic 
label i; 1967. In the government formed in April, 1967, twenty-one of the 
twenty-nine members joined the new Gaullist parliamentary group, the 
Democratic Union for the Fifth Republic, until they were required by the 
incompatibility rule of the constitution to resign thcir Assembly seats at 
the end of thirty days in favor of their replacements. One more minister 
(Maurice Schuniann) "attached" himself to the Democratic Union, and an 
additional t l~rcc members of the government joined the Independent Re- 
publican group. Although two defeated candidates were kept on in the 
cabinet (Maurice Couve de Murville as Foreign Minister and Pierre Mess- 
mer as Defense Minister), de Gaulle at last had taken an important step 
in the direction of party government.171 Again in the June, 1968, elections, 
all members of the government save Andr6 Malraux were candidates for 
the National Assembly. In the postelection government headed by Couve 
de Murville, all except Malraux had run successfully on the UDR ticket, 
including three Independent Republicans. 
VI. Cor7clusior7 
In certain respects the UDR is, as it claims to be, a new type of French 
political party. In its blending of stability and progress, it borrows from both 
the Left and the Right. With the UDR as its central force, the GauIlist 
parliamentary majority has introduced into French politics thc notion of 
the government party, whose primary purpose is to produce the electoral 
and parliamentary support necessary to allow the government to survive 
and to act. With regard to its electorate, Gaullism's voting strength in many 
of the economically most dynamic and prosperous arcas of France is indi- 
cation of its appeal to modernizers. In its commitment to a pragmatic 
striving toward economic growth and progress, it shares in that ideology 
which masquerades as the end of ide~logy. '~ '  Though de Gaullc rejects the 
vision of European politica1 unification, in many ways he and his followers 
belong to the new, not the old, Europe. 
In  four significant respects the UDR resembles those pragmatic, ma- 
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jority-seeking, "catch-a11 parties" (to borrow Otto Kircliheimer's phrase) 
which now dominate the political scene in Germany as well as in Great 
Britain and tlie United States.". First, like them it eschews sectarianism and 
actively seeks ever wider popular majorities. It draws support from a wide 
spectrum, excluding no important segment of French society. Although the 
extended Gaullist electorate is less representative of the entire population 
than the restricted electorate, in con~parative rerms the 45 percent of French 
workers who votcd for de Gaulle on December 19, 1965, is at least 10 
perc;ent more than cither the Conservative Party or the Christian Demo- 
cratic Union usually wins from thc British and German working c1asses.l" 
Second, it deplores dogmatic ideology and seeks such goals as national 
independence and ccononiic prosperity in pragmatic fashion. As Stanley 
Hoffman has observed, the Gaullist notion of grandeur is too unspecific to 
form the base for a coherent ideology.';' As the object of a fundamental and 
continuing quest, it is Gaullism's functional equivalent to the British Labour 
Party's commitment to greater social equality. The nationalist appeal, which 
excludes no onc, is wcll suitcd to unify large segments of the population. 
Third, again like the catchall parties, the UDR accepts the framework 
of the existing social and political order; indeed, as the Democratic Union 
for the Republic, its interests are closely tied to the fate of existing political 
institutions. Fourth, its primary function tends to be to support (if not to 
nominate) national poIitical leaders. 
The UDR appears to depart from the catchall party type in two iniportant 
ways. First, tlic skeptical attitude toward partics and interest groups which 
Gaullist leaders inherit fro111 their mentor tends to inhibit the open, bar- 
gaining style of politics common in catchaH partics. Organized interest 
groups are denied the access which they enjoy in most catcliall parties.';'; 
With respect to the oligarchical character of its internal organization. and 
to the meager influence which it allows its backbenclicrs. thc UDR is not 
radically different from tlie major partics in Great Britain and West Gcr- 
many.l7; And pet i t  would scenl that the Gaullist style is not one which 
allows the kind of frequcnt consnltation, discussion. and bargaining which 
soften party oligarchy in Britain. 
Like govcrnmcnt parties everywhere, the UDR acts as a transmission 
belt between governors arid governed; yet it tends to be a onc-wag coni- 
n~unication, scrving to inform and organize the clcctoratc in support of gov- 
ernment policics more than to express and digest demands from below. Al- 
though the evidencc is still spotty, it appears likely that the oligarcliical 
nature of the policy-making process in Gaullist France was one of tlie 
causes of those violent anti-Gaullist sentiments expressed by students and 
workers in May arid June, 1968. De Gaulle's mid-crisis vision of a "so- 
ciety of participation" clcarly would rcquire niajor adjustn~ents in the Gaul- 
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list political styIe, as well as in French authority patterns generall~."~ 
Secondly, the UDR is dependent in a unique way upon de Gaulle's 
leadership. Although the modern British Conservatives owe much to Dis- 
raeli and the German CDU to Adenauer, these leaders rose ~vi t lz in  the 
party and were dependent upon its strength. De GauIle rose to power before 
the UNR came into existence and subsequently refused to identify with the 
party which claimed him. 
Despite Gaullism's claim to modernity, it might be argued that it is only 
a fleeting episode which, with the passing of de Gaulle, will be followed 
by yet another reversion to assembly government. If opinion surveys are 
taken as a guide, however, it seems clear that the institutional reforms which 
Gaullism has wrought have been generally well received, though there 
is some sentiment for restoring some of the importance of parliament (but 
not of political parties),';" In April, 1962, 59 percent of all respondents in a 
national survey considered the governmental stability of the Fifth Republic 
to be a decided advantage, as against 15 percent who thought it disadvan- 
tageous.''" In the fall of that same year, 33 percent of all respondents de- 
clared the institutions of the Fifth Republic to be "better" than those of the 
Fourth Republic, while 3 1 percent found them to be "approximately equal," 
and 13 percent to be "wor~e."~" Popular approval of direct election of the 
president is much more universal. Since the old parties joined to wage war 
on de Gaulle over this reform in October, 1962, popular approval of the 
change has increased from 46 percent "yes" votes (out of all registered 
voters) in the fall of 1962 to 74 percent approval in May of 1964 - includ- 
ing 61 percent of all Communist voters and 70 percent of Socialist voters - 
to 78 percent approval in November, 1965.""0 be sure, the hostility of 
mass opinion to the Third Republic, revealed in the referendum of October 
21, 1945, did not prevent the resurrection of "Marianne" by the old 
"political class," which today remains largely aloof from the Fifth Republic. 
Even here, ho~ever ,~major  figures like Gaston Deferre, Jean Lecanuet, and 
even Franqois Mitterand seem eager to accept the new institutional frame- 
work, and thereby at long last to place the constitution around rather than 
within the political battlefield.''' A recent study of political attitudes among a 
sample of French leaders in such fields as politics, the military, the civil 
service, business, communications, and the liberal professions revealed that 
a majority of this elite group were satisfied with the institutions of the Fifth 
RepubIic and expected them to survive, though with some m~difications.''~ 
If, then, the chances for survival of the formal institutional structure of 
de Gaulle's Republic are at least fair, can the same be said of the Gaullist 
party, without whose parliamentary majority the institutions, and particu- 
IarIy the Weimar-type dual executive, might work very differently? Are 
the common beliefs of Gaullists in national independence, governmental 
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stability, and modernization sufficient to counterbalance both their disunion 
over economic and social policies and the inevitable rivalries among their 
leaders? Although the number and complexity of the factors which bear on 
this question preclude a clearcut "yes" or "no" answer, it would appear 
useful to point up some of the advantages enjoyed by Gaullist party-builders 
and the problems which remain to be solved. 
Elsewhere the emergence of catchall parties seems to have been associ- 
ated with increasing social and politicaI consensus; in France, a number of 
the old sources of conflict are at least beginning to lose their importance. 
~ecolonization is all but complete, and cold war tensions have eased con- 
siderably. Catholic farmers now sometimes join with Communist farmers in 
defense of their mutual interests, as do Comn~unist and non-Communist 
trade ~nions.~ ' '  
Until the general strike of May and June, 1968, it appeared that a 
decade of sustained prosperity, accompanied by increasing concern with 
individual advancement and greater social and geographical mobility, was 
beginning to lessen class tensions."" That month of turmoil clearly demon- 
strated once again that general affluence is no guarantee of social harmony. 
And yet, in the main, French workers - unlike student activists - seemed 
most interested in achieving better material conditions within the existing 
social system. 
Clearly the strikes and demonstrations of May, 1968, followed by a 
bitter electoral campaign, divided Frenchmen as nothing had done since 
the Algerian War. In the final analysis, however, student revolutionaries 
discovered they had little support outside the universities - certainly not 
from a Communist Party which disdained revolutionary "adventurers" and 
strove actively for a more responsible public image. The grievances of 
workers are mostly negotiable. 
In comparison with the 1930's, and even the 19503, when religion and 
foreign policy still aroused political passions, the issucs which now divide 
Frenchmen are simpIer and more susceptibIe to compromise solutions. In 
the terminology of La Palombara and Weiner, the "load" on the French 
party system has been reduced."' Though the Communist Party still com- 
mands the votes of a fifth of the French electorate, there are some signs 
that dogmatic ideologies and the parties that preach them are losing their 
appeal.'" Never before have conditions in French society been as favorable 
to the emergence of a large, coalition party. 
Through their control over the French government, at least for the mo- 
ment Gaullists are capable of manipulating their institutional environment 
in order to favor the largest parties. Direct eIection of the president should 
provide at least a periodicaI incentive to form political coaIitions. In Decem- 
ber, 1966, the National Assembly adopted a government bill which requires 
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that a candidate for the National Assembly must win a vote equal to ten 
percent of the registered voters in his district in order to enter the runoff, 
rather than five percent of the actual vote, as previously required."" Premier 
Pompidou announced that the American and British type single ballot 
system might one day become "useful, indeed necessary" in France.190 
Since politics in France, as elsewhere, is more than a simple reflection 
of the social and economic structure of society, the ultimate fate of large, 
coalition parties of the Gaullist type in France will depend in good measure 
upon the attitudes and behavior of political elites, both Gaullist and anti- 
Gaullist. On the opposition side, the emergence of a Center-Left coalition 
both broader and more stable than the present Federation of the Demo- 
cratic and Socialist Lcft would force Gaullists to unite or to face electoral 
disaster. There could be no better guarantee of Gaullist unity. To  be sure, 
the strength and rigidity of the Con~munist Party presents a serious obstacle 
to unity of the Center-Left. 
On the Gaullist side, should de Gaulle liimself serve out his seven-year 
term, should he determine that political parties, more than institutions, 
were the key to continued political stability in France, and should he give 
greater attention and respect to the organization of the Gaullist movement, 
the present majority's potential for survival would be increased. De Gaulle's 
vigorous support for Gaullist candidates in the March, 1967, elections and 
his insistence that government ministers run for parliament on the Gaullist 
slate were both signs of increasing interest in party affairs. His replacement 
of Pompidou with Couve de Murville clearly demonstrated, however, that 
he was still unwilling to allow party leaders to interfere with Presidential 
government. Whatever de Gaulle may do, the fate of the Gaullist party will 
depend in good part upon the organizational and political skills of future 
party leaders. 
Without de Gaulle, the UDR and its allies would indeed present a di- 
verse coalition, but little more diverse, certainly, than the British Labour 
Party, and far less so than the American Democratic Party. If the experi- 
ence of other catchall parties in the United States, Britain, and Germany is 
relevant, however, once having lost their arbiter, Gaullists will be able to 
maintain their grand coalition only if they demonstrate a capacity for com- 
promise, only if they facilitate the expression and adjustment of demands. 
Those Gaullist leaders who share dc Gaulle's disdain for intermediary 
groups acd his disrastc for consensus through con~promise are poorly 
equipped for the political broker's role. The Gauilist conception of the 
national intcrest as a truth visible only to those who hold themselves aloof 
from the quarrels of selfish interests is one which lends itself very pocrly 
to noncharismatic coalition building.['" If Ieadership were to fall to men who 
cling to that conception - "Gaullistcs de foi," Jean Charlot calls them - 
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the GauIlist party would face hard times indeed. It is likelier that leadership 
will fall to more pragmatic, more deeply political men like Georges Pompi- 
dou, Jacques Chaban-Delmas, and Roger Frey.'"' 
Gaullism's suspicion of political parties and distaste for democratic poli- 
tics also pose certain problenls for tlie UDR when it envisions its role in 
the French party system - even were the opposition parties to accept the 
institutional framework of the Fifth Republic. If GauIlisrn incarnates the 
national interest, can there be such a thing as a loyal opposition? Indeed, 
both Roger Frey and Michel DebrC often praise the two-party system, yet, 
like Georges Pompidou, and, in May, 1968, de Gaulle himself, they seek 
short term political gain by arguing that at present Frenchmen have a choice 
only between Gaullism and communism, thereby ignoring or implicating 
the UNR's numerous non-Communist rivals."" Or, alternatively, questioning 
the national loyalty of all rivals, Gaullist leaders tend to denounce "the 
old parties of the Left and of the Right," who are in "collusion with certain 
foreign forces desirous of bringing France back to that satellite status to 
which the regime which collapsed in 1958 had reduced it.""" Even if the 
dream of Frey and DebrC of a British-style two-party system were to ma- 
terialize (and Communist strength and rigidity make a dualistic party sys- 
tem an unrealistic goal for the present), it is not yet clear that Gaullists 
would be prepared to accept a loyal opposition. 
The survival of the Gaullist party as one of the major parties of France 
should be no difficult feat, given the accomplishments of the Gaullist period 
and the party organization already built. To preserve a Gaullist tnnjorify, 
however, will be more difficult. The gap between the extended and re- 
stricted electorates, the instability of party identification even within the 
latter, the incon~pleteness of party organization. the doubts of Gaullist 
leaders regarding the legitimacy of party government, their Iack of agree- 
ment on economic policy, and their frequent bias against a politics of adjust- 
ment and conlpromise - all of these suggest problems that must be re- 
solved if the UDR is to continue to realize its stated majoritarian vocation. 
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